Hasselblad Electronic Imaging

0

No comments posted yet

Comments

Slide 1

Hasselblad Electronic Imaging

Slide 2

The Swedish company Hasselblad became a camera legend when it was used in space during the 1960s.

Slide 10

The following photo of Edwin ”Buzz” Aldrin (no. 2 on the moon) and Victor Hasselblad – the founder of the company, was taken in Gothenburg, Sweden.

Slide 12

The Hasselblad system has been loved all over the world for its flexibility, superior performance and simplicity.

Slide 22

Headquartered in the industrial city Gothenburg, in the south west of Sweden, Hasselblad became a cult brand in the 1960s and 1970s.

Slide 26

Believe it or not – but though Hasselblad was an iconic camera, there were several concerns already in the 1980s.

Slide 27

The medium format segment of the industry faced declining revenues already in the 1980s.

Slide 28

A shrinking market may in the long run lead to increased price competition, and thus lower profits.

Slide 29

Maybe Hasselblad should try to diversify its business in order to grow?

Slide 30

In addition to this, the ’Mavica shock’ from Sony’s launch of a semi-digital camera in 1981 had put digital imaging on the agenda of all big players.

Slide 31

Even though the shift was far away, especially for high-end firms like Hasselblad, it would be unwise to completely ignore the new technology…

Slide 33

Hasselblad was a mechanical company, and it would be quite risky to have only a competence related to coggwheels the day when electronics transform the industry.

Slide 34

“Even though I did not believe in the Mavica concept, I was convinced that the photo chemical film would in the future be subject to serious competition from electronical photography and would eventually be substituted by this technology” //CEO Jerry Öster, 1991

Slide 35

”I met Sony’s CEO and the person behind the Mavica project. It soon became clear that the technology had so many shortcomings that it would not lead to any commercial success.” Jerry Öster, CEO

Slide 37

But at the same time – could a relatively small company like Hasselblad enter at this very early point and compete with such poor image quality with diluting its brand? Sounds risky.

Slide 38

Öster discussed the issue with the R&D Manager Lennart Stålfors (who was an electrical engineer). They both concluded that the Mavica was not the way forward for Hasseblad, but were still certain that digital imaging would become a serious threat in the future.

Slide 39

But what to do then?

Slide 40

Was it possible to learn more about digital imaging by developing applications and use this knowledge to develop cameras at a later point?

Slide 41

Stålfors and Hasselblad had been collaborating with the Space Division of SAAB for a few years.

Slide 42

The project concerned image analysis related to space and aircraft applications. The outcome of this was called OSIRIS, a scanner that could digitize images in order to send them.

Slide 43

However, the image quality was too poor and the price too high. OSIRIS did not become a success.

Slide 44

Based upon insights from this project, Stålfors recognized that the transmission of images via the phone line was underdeveloped.

Slide 45

Those photos which were sent had a significantly lower image quality when they arrived.

Slide 46

Thus, photographers had to use their dark rooms instead. In many applications, this time consumption was quite a big problem.

Slide 47

Could Hasselblad develop a digital tele-photo sender?

Slide 48

Such a product would be lighter and offer a superior image quality and thus, it was compatible with Hasselblad’s brand.

Slide 49

Jerry Öster thought this was a good idea and the development work was initiated.

Slide 50

The goal was to have a working prototype ready until the Olympic Games in Los Angeles 1984. The Swedish newspaper Expressen joined Hasselblad in this work.

Slide 51

After days and nights of hard work, two tele-photo scanners could eventually join Expressen’s photographers when they crossed the Atlantic ocean in order to cover the Olympic Games in LA.

Slide 52

It looked like this:

Slide 55

The ”Digiscan” became a great success!

Slide 56

When the other photographers were still queuing for the dark rooms, Expressen’s photographers pulled up the Digiscan and sent their photos home and they could be published much faster.

Slide 57

Since photo journalists from all around the world had gathered in LA, this was fantastic marketing for Hasselblad.

Slide 61

Back home in Gothenburg it was clear that Hasselblad had a great opportunity to create good revenues and more knowledge about digital imaging.

Slide 62

But how should it be done?

Slide 63

Digital Imaging and scanners were at this point very different businesses compared to the analogue camera work.

Slide 64

Maybe it was better to separate this from the company and give it an opportunity to grow on its own…

Slide 65

In 1985, the subsidiary HASSELBLAD ELECTRONIC IMAGING was born.

Slide 67

Take a good luck at the brand. The ’Hasselblad’ logo is combined with a different font for ’Electronic Imaging’. This was done in order to communicate that while this was a premium product, it was still different from Hasselblad’s traditional business.

Slide 69

Behind the Hasselblad building…

Slide 70

On the back…

Slide 71

There was a bridge over to another building…

Slide 73

Hasselblad Electronic Imaging (HEIAB) was put on the other side of this bridge, physically separated, yet still connected with the mother company.

Slide 75

Lennart Stålfors became the CEO of HEIAB and brought a few engineers from the mother company.

Slide 76

The Board of HEIAB was comprised of Stålfors and some people from management, the CFO Bengt Ahlgren (second to the left) and CEO Jerry Öster (third to the right).

Slide 77

At this point, HEIAB only had a prototype and there were still doubts about the future success of this initiative.

Slide 78

Many people at the company wondered why Hasselblad should do something like this, which was outside the core competence of the company.

Slide 79

HEIAB started off as something very small, with small resources.

Slide 80

But they had:

Slide 81

A fantastic brand.

Slide 82

A prototype with great potential.

Slide 83

And some highly entrepreneurial and very skilled electronic engineers.

Slide 84

The Digiscan prototype was developed further into what became the Dixel.

Slide 85

It looked like this:

Slide 91

This is an image that has been digitized with the Dixel.

Slide 92

There was a great demand for the Dixel and HEIAB grew rapidly in the 1980s.

Slide 93

The Dixel became an integral part of the photo journalist’s equipment.

Slide 97

The company started to make good profits for Hasselblad already in 1988.

Slide 99

Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year (in Swedish)

Slide 100

Meet the team from 1988:

Slide 102

See the vacant (empty) positions? HEIAB was indeed expanding back in these days…

Slide 103

In 1989, 25 percent of Hasselblad’s profit came from HEIAB, an initiative that was only 4 years old.

Slide 104

This is a fantastic success!

Slide 105

HEIAB started to develop other applications for photo journalism such as images storage systems and image management software.

Slide 117

HEIAB kept doing very well through 1989-91.

Slide 122

However, Nikon launched a tele-photo sender in 1992 which was superior to the Dixel and thus killed tha flagship of HEIAB.

Slide 124

”1992 was a tough year. We were not able to continue the great expansion that was experienced up until 1991…”

Slide 125

This was the beginning of the end for HEIAB.

Slide 126

But the initiative was still a great accomplishment by Hasselblad.

Slide 127

Instead of throwing R&D at digital imaging without any commercial results, the company managed to create large profits while at the same time enhancing their knowledge about digital imaging.

Slide 128

Which were the success factors behind HEIAB?

Slide 129

1. They started out on a small scale with low expecations. This is absolutely necessary, because new things must by definition be small in the beginning. Big companies often ’think big’ and thereby miss out on small opportunities which become big later on.

Slide 130

2. Hasselblad dared to leave its comfort zone. Was the OSIRIS project a failure because it did not generate any revenues? No, it was actually here that the ’Dixel opportunity’ was discovered. Companies which only stick to their ’core competence’ will never find such possibilities.

Slide 131

3. The HEIAB people were the right guys for this. They were creators, not administrators of existing things.

Slide 132

4. While still leveraging upon the Hasselblad brand, HEIAB was very autonomous. No one except for the CEO could touch it, and thus HEIAB wasn’t starved in the daily internal competition for resources.

Slide 133

When the HEIAB business started to fade, most of the staff moved back into the mother company in order to develop digital cameras from 1993 and on.

Slide 134

But that’s a different story.

Slide 135

So, this was the story about how a company at one point succeeded in bridging the gap between the daily business and the future technological revolution.

Slide 136

Today, the bridge is gone and besides, Hasselblad has moved to another building.

Slide 137

When you know the history behind, images like this one can suddenly look like monuments.

Slide 138

Christian Sandström is a PhD student at Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg, Sweden. He writes and speaks about disruptive innovation and technological change. www.christiansandstrom.org christian.sandstrom@chalmers.se

Summary: How Hasselblad entered the early days of digital imaging.

Tags: heiab hasselblad electronic imaging digital

URL: